Courts and commentators are at odds about EULAs. The commentators decry a contract formation process that the courts take in stride. 5 The process: a buyer purchases software in a shrinkwrapped box or-as is now more common-by downloading it online; a standard form contract is inside the box (a "shrinkwrap" EULA), or displayed on a splash screen during installation (a "clickwrap" EULA). No negotiation is allowed;
by the time the buyer can read the agreement the only options are to return the software, or accept the terms. Where return is not a meaningful option, acquiescence is the only alternative. Mark Lemley has emphasized, the tendency of EULAs to lead to acquiescence. He notes that the return of the software turns out to be sufficiently inconvenient as to be impractical and in any event turns out in practice to be illusory: software vendors and retail stores generally refuse to accept software returned under those conditions. [In addition], the specified conduct that indicates acceptance is the opening of a package and the loading of software the consumer has already paid for--precisely the conduct one would expect the user to engage in if she had been unaware of the shrinkwrap license. Lemley's points are even more compelling when the software is downloaded online that there is no physical retailer to approach and no physical installation CD to return. In a barrage of criticism that supports the perception that the Internet is "turning contracting on its head," the commentators complain that the formation process unduly restricts buyers' freedom; and, that sellers exploit the formation process to impose excessively seller-favorable terms that deprive buyers of important intellectual property rights. 7 The 5 See infra n. 6 (academic criticisms) and n. 7 (attitude of the courts). Step-Saver, both parties sent each other forms with different conditions and obligations; the EULA involved was one of the forms exchanged, and the question of its enforceability was a routine battle-of-theforms issue. In Vault, the court did not reach the issue of the validity of EULAs generally because the court found that the buyer knew the terms of the license before purchasing the software. Vault, at 268-70. A case clearly rejecting ProCd is Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F.Supp.2d 1332 (D.Kan.2000), discussed infra, n.17. 9 Supra n. 8. 10 Id. at 1451 -52. 11 See infra Section III.
challenge as it routinely enforces the offending terms. There is, however, reason to think contract will meet the challenge, and indeed that it will do so relatively soon.
I do not take the same, ultimately sanguine view of a second type of "digital age"
contract-Terms of Use Agreements, often referred to as "browsewrap" agreements.
Terms of Use Agreements (TOUs) govern the rapidly increasing variety of social, political, and commercial purposes for which we use web sites. Like EULAs, TOUs are no-negotiation, standard form agreements; unlike EULAs, one may read them at any time since they are routinely accessible via hyperlinks at the bottom of home pages. Web site visitors are, however, neither asked nor required to assent to the terms by clicking on an "I agree" button or by performing any other similar affirmative act of assent; 12 thus, visitors may, and typically do, just "browse" on by without reading, or even opening, the agreement. 13 The result is that, as with EULAs, passive acquiescence is the rule. Web site owners may-and do-exploit this fact to impose terms which unacceptably compromise web site visitor's privacy. 14 Unfortunately, the prospects for rectifying this situation appear considerably dimmer than they do in the case of EULAs. TOUs pose the most significant challenge to current contract law.
The cornerstone of my analysis is the claim that when certain ideal conditions are fulfilled, standard form contracting is a freedom-enhancing process yielding acceptable terms. To characterize the ideal formation process, I combine themes and ideas from both the relational theory of contracts and law and economics. Relational theory provides 12 See, e. g. Specht v. Netscape, 306 F.3d 17 (S.D. N.Y. 2001) (describing the TOU formation process). 13 See infra n. 16.. 14 See infra Section IV.
the picture of contracting as a norm-governed activity. Section I defines the relevant concept of a norm and also defines the key notion of a value-justified norm. Section I also introduces the first assumption characterizing the ideal formation process-the assumption (roughly) that contractual terms are consistent with relevant, value-justified norms. Section II adapts a well-known law and economics argument to complete the characterization of the ideal formation process and argue that, in such a process, the profit-maximizing strategy for sellers is to offer buyers norm-consistent contractual terms.
Sections I and II comprise my main theoretical contribution: a novel, norm-based theory of standard form contracting. The theory applies equally to Internet and non-
Internet contracting, and this shows that the Internet is not turning contract law on its head; however, the theory also reveals that Internet contracting poses serious, unmet challenges to contract law. The consideration of EULAs and TOUs in Sections III and IV analyze these challenges. Section III argues that the criticisms of the commentators show that the use of EULAs fails to approximate the ideal formation process. The problem is that they contain certain key terms concerning intellectual property rights where those terms are not governed by value-justified norms. It follows that the terms are unacceptable and reduce freedom; consequently, legal intervention is (most likely) required. However, once the lack of value-justified norms is remedied, the use of EULAs will yield acceptable terms and enhance freedom (assuming that there are no other reasons their use fails to sufficiently closely approximate the ideal formation process).
Section IV argues for an essentially similar result in the case of TOUs: they contain terms allowing the site to collect information about visitors, where those terms are not governed by value-justified norms. There is one critical difference. While there is reason to think that the defects in EULAs can be relatively easily remedied, there is less reason to be optimistic about remedying similar defects in TOUs. TOUs pose the most difficult challenge to current contract law.
I. Norms and the Assumption of Norm Completeness
When the contract formation process meets certain ideal conditions, standard form contracting is a freedom-enhancing process yielding acceptable terms. The same point holds in actual practice to the extent that practice approximates the ideal. I will not, however, make any claim about the extent to which practice approximates the ideal. My claim is normative: we should try to ensure that practice approximates the ideal. We should promote freedom because free self-direction is the hallmark of the thoughtful, democratic citizen who guides his or her actions by principles freely adopted as the result of critical reflection. We value such self-direction for its own sake. 15 Failures to realize the ideal formation process can provide grounds for legal invention designed to bring practice closer to the ideal; in the case of EULAs and TOUs, there are failures justifying such intervention. There are three conditions which characterize the ideal formation process. This section characterizes the first; the next section, the remaining two.
I begin by describing the purchase of a typical consumer good. The contract is presented after payment and delivery, and the transaction concludes-as is typical-with 15 17 In a retail transaction, the buyer typically enters two contracts-one with the manufacturer (containing warranties among other terms), and one with the retailer (end-seller). In the latter case, the retailer is the offeree. See Klocek, supra n. 8, at 1341. In the former, the manufacturer is the offeror. See ProCD, supra n. 8, at 1452. The Klocek court overlooks this distinction when it objects to the ProCD decision on the ground that the software manufacturer, ProCD, is the offeree, not the offeror. Klocek, supra n. 8, at 1341. The first is, "Do not deceive another about a material element of a contract."
Contracting parties (some at least) conform to this regularity in part because they think they ought to. Parties may conform to the non-deceitfulness norm unreflectively (in the way we unreflectively enter elevators and assume our proper place), but it is certainly plausible that the norm is value-justified. That is, it is plausible that everyone would, after sufficient, adequately informed, and unbiased reflection, regard conformity to the norm as justified. The "do not deceive" norm is one of many norms governing the behavior of contracting parties. Such norms answer the question, "What should so-andso type of contracting party do in such-and-such type of situation?" It is helpful to distinguish such norms from those which answer the question, "Should so-and-so type of contract contain such-and-such type of term?" 26 The next example illustrates such a norm.
Consider the provision, typically found in contracts for the sale of refrigerators, which makes the manufacturer liable for defects in the motor, shelves, and doors and the buyer liable for damage to the same. This allocation of risk implements this norm: other things being equal, the party who can most cost-effectively prevent a loss-the best lossrisk of product malfunctions between the manufacturer and the buyer. To the extent such a risk allocation has become a sanction-supported regularity to which buyers and sellers think they ought to conform, the risk allocation is a norm.
avoider--should bear that loss. 27 This is the manufacturer in regard to defects because it has more expertise and benefits from economies of scale; the buyer, on the other hand, is the best loss-avoider in regard to damage to the motor, doors, and shelves since the buyer may avoid damage simply by using those items in a reasonable way. 28 Like the nondeceitfulness norm, it is plausible that this norm is value-justified.
It is instructive to compare the "best loss-avoider" norm to the third, and final, example: namely, a seller (within broad limits) may disclaim consequential damages. It may seem at first sight that this cannot be a norm. A norm is a sanction-supported regularity where the regularity exists in part because people think they ought to conform to it. "Sellers may disclaim consequential damages" does express a sanction-supported regularity; sellers regularly disclaim consequential damages, and courts regularly enforce the disclaimers. But how can it be true that buyers think they ought to conform to the regularity? The vast majority of buyers do not even know what consequential damages are, let alone realize that sellers are allowed to disclaim them; so, how can it be true that buyers think they ought to accept and abide by the disclaimers? The answer is that, as empirical studies confirm, people think that they ought to abide by the law (other things being equal). 29 Hence, since the disclaimer of consequential damages is a legally 27 In this case, the "other things being equal" rider is particularly important. Best loss-avoider concerns are just one of the many considerations that guide our judgment about who should bear a loss. We may, for example, think that someone who commits an intentional tort should bear the losses he or she causes even if the victim is the best loss-avoider. ("An analysis recognizing the existence of contracts of adhesion in price-competitive markets admits that the costs saved by shifting risk to the customers via form terms may well be returned to the customer by means of lower prices or more advantageous terms concerning the few items that are generally bargained or shopped for").
the fact that most buyers do not read standard form contracts to impose excessively seller-favorable terms. 31 Why think otherwise? Because offering norm-consistent terms is the best strategy for maximizing profits; hence, rational profit-motive driven sellers do so. 32 The argument merits its own section.
II. Norm-Consistent Terms As Profit-Maximizing
I begin with a summary of the argument: (1) whenever a contract contains a norm-inconsistent term, at least some buyers will notice the inconsistency. (2) Buyers who detect a norm-violation will not, other things being equal, buy from sellers offering norm-inconsistent terms; (3) sellers are unable to discriminate between buyers who will,
and those who will not detect a norm-inconsistency; therefore, (4) Schwartz and Wilde demonstrated in a general theoretical setting how even a quite small proportion of smart consumers who actually read and shopped for standard-form contract clauses could put enough competitive pressure on firms so that they would adopt efficient standard-form terms (terms whose cost to the firm was less than the value that consumers placed on them. Id. There are two key differences between the Schwartz and Wilde argument and the one I offer. First, I assume contracting is a norm-governed activity while Swartz and Wilde make no mention of norms. Second, my argument proposes a normative ideal while Schwartz and Wilde claim to model actual practice.
sufficiently competitive with respect to terms, the profit-maximizing strategy is to offer all buyers norm-consistent terms.
A. The Inconsistency-Detection Assumption Most buyers do not read standard form contracts, so, why think that, whenever a contract contains a norm-inconsistent term, at least some buyers will notice the inconsistency? I will not argue for this claim; I will simply assume it is true. This-the inconsistency-detection assumption-is the second of the three idealizations which characterize the ideal formation process, and the justification for the assumption is that its role is limited to the characterization of that ideal. However, as with the norm completeness assumption, it is worth noting that practice does reasonably closely approximate the detection assumption.
To this end, consider that the inconsistency-detection assumption is extremely weak; it assumes only that some buyers detect norm-violations; it makes no claim about how many. It is the third assumption-the assumption of a sufficiently term-competitive market-that includes such a claim. 33 It is certainly plausible that a norm-inconsistent term will not escape the notice of every buyer. To begin with, some buyers do read 33 Compare the "informed minority" assumption that plays a key role in the Schwartz and Wilde argument. They assume: (1) an informed minority of buyers detect terms in standard form contracts that conflict with their preferences; (2) such buyers will not buy from sellers offering such contracts; and (3) the number of non-buying informed buyers is sufficiently great that the lost profit is greater than any gain the seller realizes from the offending terms. When buyers detect a norm-inconsistent provision in a seller's contract, they will not-other things being equal--buy from that seller. 38 To see why, recall that a norm specifies a regularity to which group members believe they ought to conform. Normviolation detectors will, therefore, perceive a norm-inconsistent seller as not treating them as they ought to be treated. Other things being equal, buyers will purchase from sellers they perceive as treating them as they ought to be treated, not from those whom they perceive as not doing so-assuming norm-consistent sellers exist. 39 The third assumption, introduced shortly, ensures that such sellers exist.
C. Sellers' Inability to Discriminate
How will sellers respond to the existence of norm-violation detectors who will, other things being equal, not buy from sellers offering norm-inconsistent contractual terms? If sellers could reliably discriminate between buyers who will, and those who will not, detect a norm-inconsistency, it would be possible for sellers to offer norm-consistent terms to the inconsistency-detectors and more seller-favorable, norm-inconsistent terms to the rest. In mass market contexts, however, sellers cannot reliably discriminate. where negotiation is either not allowed, or not desired by the buyer-as is typical in the case of purchasing water heaters, hair dryers, personal computers, and the like.
D. The Profit-Maximizing Strategy
The final claim is that, when sellers cannot discriminate between those who do, and those who do not, detect norm-inconsistencies, then, in a sufficiently termcompetitive market, the profit-maximizing strategy is to offer all buyers norm-consistent terms; hence, rational, profit-motive driven sellers will do so. The argument begins by stating the conditions for a sufficiently term-competitive market. There are two conditions; they comprise the third assumption characterizing the ideal formation process--the assumption of a sufficiently term-competitive market. First: multiple sellers offer more or less equivalent products at more or less the same price; buyers can just as easily buy from one seller as another, and sellers do not collude to ensure that they all offer the same contractual terms. 41 Second: there are enough norm-violation-detecting inconsistent contractual term; on the contrary, the argument assumes a sales-person explicitly proposes a contractual term, and hence assumes a context in which detection of norminconsistency would be likely.
buyers that a seller's gain from offering a norm-inconsistent term is smaller than the loss which results if norm-violation-detectors are able to buy from a norm-consistent seller.
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The first condition a seller offering a norm-inconsistent term will (other things being equal) lose the business of every norm-violation-detecting buyer-provided that at least one seller offers entirely norm-consistent terms. This follows from the fact that, other things being equal, buyers who detect a norm-violation in a seller's contract will not buy from that seller. The "other things being equal" rider merely concerns trivial exceptions which do not matter here (e. g., the buyer purchases from a norm-inconsistent seller because the seller is a relative). The second condition ensures that there will be normconsistent sellers. Thus, when both conditions hold, the profit-maximizing strategy is to offer all buyers norm-consistent terms, and hence, rational, profit-motive driven sellers will do so.
It is instructive to compare the assumption of a sufficiently term-competitive market with the norm completeness and inconsistency-detection assumptions. In the latter cases, it is plausible that practice reasonably closely approximates the ideal. Is the same true of the assumption of a sufficiently term-competitive market? Opinion is divided; some take the claim for granted while others raise doubts. 43 Neither side in the 42 Compare Swartz & Wilde, Intervening, supra n. 32, at 661 -663. They propose that there is lack of sufficient term-competition (in their terminology, a "monopolistic" market with respect to terms) if "(1) the market is not price competitive; and (2) the term at issue appears in arcane legal language and fine or otherwise inconspicuous print." Id. at 662. The point of (2) is to identify those cases in which there is a high cost to consumers of searching for and understanding relevant contractual terms; the idea is that in such cases "too few searchers may exist to generate a nonmonopolistic term structure." Id.
43 Cruz & Hinck supra n. 33 summarize the debate and argue against the assumption of a termcompetitive market. Cruz and Hinck's model does not take into account the fact that a court is highly likely to refuse to enforce clearly norm-inconsistent terms on grounds of unconscionability in a standard form contract between a merchant and a consumer. This means the gain from a debate, however, denies the normative importance of the ideal of a term-competitive market as a guide in determining when legal regulation may be appropriate in practice.
Since I am only proposing term-competitiveness as a normative goal, I will put to one side the question of the extent to which term-competitive markets exist in practice.
E. Conclusion
We have reached the conclusion that, in an ideal formation process, rational, profit-motive driven sellers will offer all buyers norm-consistent terms. Two further conclusions follow: the terms are acceptable; and, they enhance freedom. The norm completeness assumption ensures acceptability. The norm-completeness is the assumption that for any possible contractual provision, there is at least one relevant, value-justified norm with which the provision is consistent or inconsistent. In the ideal formation process, all terms will be norm-consistent. A term consistent with all relevant value-justified norms is acceptable-in the sense that buyers regard (or would on reflection regard) the terms as ones they ought to accept and to which they ought to conform. The next section argues that, given an ideal formation process, the use of standard form contracts promotes freedom.
III. Freedom
In a no-negotiation, standard form contract, buyers are constrained to accept the terms, and constrained choices are the example par excellence of unfree choices. For norm-inconsistent term would be short-lived and hence less likely than Cruz and Hinck suggest to outweigh associated losses. For a recent assertion that "[c]ompetition for market share in the eenvironment may . . . deter businesses from drafting onerous terms or even motivate them to write terms favorable to consumers," see Hillman, Boilerplate, supra n. 37, at 853.
example, when the thief, with a gun to your head, demands, "Your money or your life!", the thief violates your freedom by compelling your choice. You have only one meaningful option: hand over your money. Standard form contracting hardly rises to the level of gun-to-the-head compulsion; nonetheless, where refusing to enter the contract is not a meaningful option, no-negotiation contracting does share with the gun-to-the-head example the feature that your options are reduced to one. So, how can buyers freely assent to the terms of a standard form contract? There are seemingly compelling considerations that the answer is that they cannot.
A. The Argument That Consent Is Not Free Margaret Radin argues forcefully that our consent to standard form contracts is not free. She contends that free "[c]onsent requires a knowing understanding of what one
is doing in a context in which it is actually possible for one to do otherwise, and an affirmative action in doing something, rather than a merely passive acquiescence in accepting something." 44 Standard form contracting fails to meet these requirements when refusing to buy the product is not a meaningful option. In such cases, it is not "actually possible for one to do otherwise" than enter the contract; hence, entering it is "merely passive acquiescence in accepting something" and not "an affirmative action in doing something."
If this is correct, enforcing standard form contracts flies in the face of the following fundamental principle of democratic political organization: absent special circumstances, a private party does not have the power to unilaterally impose legally enforceable obligations on other adult parties. 45 Exceptions aside, only governments can legitimately exercise such power. Normally, the only way a private party can impose legally enforceable terms on another adult party is to secure the latter party's free assent to being bound by the terms. As Mark Lemley notes, "Assent by both parties to the terms of a contract has long been the fundamental principle animating contract law. Indeed, it is the concept of assent that gives contracts legitimacy and distinguishes them from private legislation."
B. The Solution
The problem is an illusion. In an ideal formation process, buyers do freely assent to the terms of standard form contracts; hence, consent is free in practice to the extent practice approximates the ideal. Ironically, it is precisely the no-negotiation aspect of standard form contracting that promotes buyers' freedom.
The key point is that even a highly constrained choice can, depending on the circumstances, be an entirely free choice. Imagine, for example, that you have your heart set on a vacation in the Cayman Islands; unfortunately, your tight budget cannot afford the prohibitively expensive food in the Caymans. Your solution is to constrain your food choices by opting for an "all inclusive" vacation package which offers airfare, hotel, and food for a single relatively low price. In doing so, you voluntarily constrain your food options in order to freely realize your vacation goal. Contrast the thief example. You do have an option: You could refuse and be shot. The gun-compulsion violates your 45 See Lemley, Terms of Use, supra n. 1, at 464 -65. 46 Id.
freedom of choice, not because it leaves you without any option, but because it leaves you without a meaningful one. In the Cayman islands vacation example, eating the hotelprovided-food is a meaningful option in the sense that it is an essential means to realizing your vacation goal. Similarly, the no-negotiation aspect of standard form contracts does not violate freedom because the use of the contracts does not deprive buyers of a meaningful choice.
Carol's water heater purchase illustrates the point. The demise of the water heater was an unwelcome intrusion that disrupted her pursuit of important goals; she wants to return pursuing those goals as quickly as possible by spending the minimum time and effort necessary to obtain a water heater on acceptable contractual terms. 47 The standard form contract offers her a pre-packaged deal which--assuming an ideal formation process--she knows is acceptable without even having to read the contract. Entering the contract is a highly cost-effective means for her to freely pursue her goals. In this way, entering the contract enhances her freedom. Indeed, Carol meets two of Radin's three requirements for free consent.
Radin insists that free "[c]onsent requires [1] a knowing understanding of what one is doing [2] in a context in which it is actually possible for one to do otherwise, and
[3] an affirmative action in doing something, rather than a merely passive acquiescence in accepting something." 48 Carol meets the first and third requirements. She has "a knowing understanding of what [she] is doing" since she knows the contractual terms are acceptable. In addition, entering the contract is a cost-effective means to further the pursuit of important goals, so entering it is not "passive acquiescence" but an "affirmative action" that fits into an overall plan aimed at effectively realizing ends. The only requirement Carol fails to meet is that it should be "actually possible for one to do otherwise." It is not possible for Carol to do otherwise-in the sense that she has to have a water heater, and any contract under which she purchases one will almost certainly be a no-negotiation contract containing similar terms. But it is precisely the possibility of negotiation that Carol does not want. She wants the pre-packaged deal as an convenient, cost-effective way to pursue ends that are important to her. It is the need not to negotiate that enhances Carol's freedom. 49 But doesn't the no-negotiation contract nonetheless deprive Carol of the freedom to negotiate if she wanted to? And, to that extent, doesn't it violate freedom? The answer is that Carol does not want to negotiate. Why would she?
She knows the terms are acceptable in the sense that she regards them as the terms to which she ought to agree. Negotiation would be pointless.
C. Conclusion
In an ideal formation process, the use of standard form contracts results in acceptable terms and promotes freedom. Before arguing that EULAs contain terms not governed by value-justified norms, one preliminary is in order. It is helpful to distinguish between two types of contractual terms: risk allocation terms, and normal course terms. The lack of value-justified norms occurs only with the latter.
A. Two Types of Terms
Risk allocation terms assign the risks associated with product malfunctions; they include warranties, limitations on liability, and arbitration clauses. Normal course terms do not assign malfunction risks; rather, they specify obligations arising in the normal course of the product's performance (e. g., an obligation to have the products serviced only by authorized service personnel). 52 Any contractual provision imposing an obligation is either a risk allocation term or a normal course term. There are, after all, only two possibilities: either the contract is performed as promised, or it is not. Terms relevant in the first eventuality are normal course terms; terms relevant in the second are risk allocation terms.
Normal course terms are relatively rare in standard form contracts governing the sale of non-digital consumer goods. 53 When you buy a hair dryer, for example, the seller typically does not impose significant contractual restrictions on your use of the hair dryer.
You simply become the owner of that piece of personal property and may, within broad limits, do with it as you wish. In EULAs, on the other hand, sellers typically retain ownership to the software and merely license certain uses of it. 54 Normal course terms define the limits of the license. The norms governing certain crucial limit-defining terms turn out not to be value-justified.
B. Risk Allocation Terms
Completeness and clarity call for a brief consideration of risk allocation terms.
Courts have refused to enforce at least three types of risk allocation terms in EULAs:
restrictions on class actions, 55 unreasonable arbitration clauses, 56 and unreasonable choice of law and choice of forum provisions. 57 The effect in each case was to severely circumscribe the ability of buyers to obtain effective redress against a breaching buyer.
The litigation does not, however, suggest a lack of value-justified norms, just the opposite. There is a value-justified norm violated by including such terms in a standard 53 See supra n. 52 for examples of normal course terms that do appear in contracts for the sale of non-digital products. In general, risk allocation terms in EULAs have generated relatively little controversy. One plausible explanation is that software, after all, is still a product, and that the risk allocation issues which arise in regard to software are not all that different from the risk allocation issues arising in regard to non-digital products. It is, therefore, reasonable to assume that the norms relevant in non-digital standard form contracts have proven readily adaptable to the software context. It would be interesting to pursue this line of inquiry, but I will not do so here; instead, I turn to normal course terms.
C. Normal Course Terms
EULAs contain significant normal course terms which fail to be governed by value-justified norms. In support of this claim, I consider two normal course terms, terms which have been at the center of the debate about EULAs: prohibitions on reverse engineering; and, prohibitions on the allowing transfers of the software to third parties.
Both terms restrict the intellectual property rights buyers would otherwise typically acquire when purchasing the software. In each case, the terms are consistent with the relevant, prevailing norm; however-as the criticisms in the literature clearly establish--the norms are not value-justified. After discussing reverse engineering and transfers to third parties, I consider whether there are other terms in EULAs which are not governed by value-justified norms.
Reverse engineering
Reverse engineering software consists in examining its programming in order to learn how the software works. 58 Under federal copyright law, reverse engineering is permissible as a fair use provided it is done for a legitimate purpose (such as to gain access to functional specifications necessary to make a compatible program), and when reverse engineering provides the only means of access to those elements of the software that are not protected by intellectual property rights. 59 Software licenses, however, typically prohibit reverse engineering. 60 The main motive for doing so is to control the ability to write programs (called "applications" in this context) which interoperate with the seller's program (called a "platform" 61 Sellers are not primarily concerned to prevent the development of competing products.
Reverse engineering software is difficult and expensive to be an efficient way to develop a competing product. Samuelson & Scotchmer, Reverse Engineering, supra n. 60, at 1613 -1615. 62 As Samuelson and Scotchmer note, "no one would dispute that Microsoft's control over the APIs for developing applications for the Windows platform is an important source of its enduring power in this market." Samuelson & Scotchmer, Reverse Engineering, supra n. 60, at 1620. To write a program that will run on Microsoft Windows, you need to know the application program interfaces (APIs). Microsoft maintains the APIs as a trade secret and licenses access to them. Programmers unwilling to enter into the necessary license agreement have one other way of gaining access to the APIs: reverse engineer Windows. Microsoft contractually blocks this path to access by prohibiting reverse engineering in the Windows license.
the platform maintained as trade secrets. The developer typically has two ways to obtain the requisite knowledge: reverse engineer the software, or enter into a license agreement with the platform sellers. Contractually prohibiting reverse engineering increases a platform seller's control over the creation of interoperable products by compelling (law abiding) application developers to negotiate with them to obtain the knowledge they need.
The current norm is that platform sellers may contractually prohibit reverse engineering. A norm is a sanction-supported regularity which exists in part because people think they ought to act in accord with the regularity. There is a relevant sanctionsupported regularity: application developers (for the most part) abide by sellers'
contractually imposed restrictions on reverse engineering, restrictions the courts enforce.
For this regularity to qualify as a norm, application developers must abide by the restrictions because they think they ought to. It may appear that people do not think they ought to conform. Commentators argue that sellers should not be allowed to impose prohibitions on reverse engineering, 63 and there are situations in which buyers would prefer to reverse engineer instead of negotiate a license agreement. 64 So why believe buyers think they ought to abide by contractual prohibitions on reverse engineering?
Because the restrictions are (currently) legally enforceable, and the buyers think that they ought to abide by the law.
65 63 See infra text accompanying notes 66 -68. 64 See Samuelson & Scotchmer, Reverse Engineering, supra n. 60, 1615 -20. 65 See Section I(A)(1).
The crucial question is whether the norm is value-justified. A norm is valuejustified if we would, after sufficient, adequately informed, and unbiased reflection, regard conformity to the norm as justified in light of the values we hold. It is extremely unlikely that we would so conclude. Those who have carefully considered the question conclude-tentatively or unequivocally-that sellers should not have unlimited discretion to prohibit reverse engineering. The fundamental reason is that allowing reverse engineering is an important factor in promoting innovation and competition, and in ensuring compatibility between products. As Samuelson and Scotchmer note in their definitive analysis of reverse engineering, . . . the welfare effects of reverse engineering in the software industry are . . . complex . . . However, on balance, reverse engineering and interoperability are important because they promote development of a wider range of software from a wider array of developers than a market in which platform developers were insulated from reverse engineering. To the extent that the enforcement of antireverse engineering clauses would have a detrimental effect on competitive development and innovation, legal decisionmakers may be justified in not enforcing them. I conclude that the current norm, "Allow sellers to prohibit reverse engineering"
is not value-justified. It follows that including prohibitions on reverse engineering in standard form contracts used to mass market software imposes on buyers unacceptable terms which violate freedom. Enforcing such terms is, therefore, inconsistent with realizing the normative goal of approximating the ideal formation process; hence, courts
should not enforce them, and, if courts continue to do so, legislative action should ensure that such terms are not enforceable. But is legal intervention clearly necessary? Why won't the market remedy the situation? It could do so by leading to the emergence of a value-justified norm governing restrictions on reverse engineering; once such a norm emerged, sellers would offer terms consistent with the norm (assuming a sufficiently close approximation to the ideal formation process). This has not yet happened, and the persistence in EULAs of prohibitions on reverse engineering provides reason to think that the future will resemble the past.
It bears emphasis that this conclusion holds only for the standard form contracts used to mass market software. It does not follow for contracts where parties of roughly equal bargaining power explicitly negotiate terms. In the standard form case, buyers (in an ideal formation process) rely on the existence of value-justified norms to ensure that the terms are acceptable. There is no such reliance in the case of explicitly negotiated terms. Of course, one may argue that prohibitions on reverse engineering should not be enforceable in such cases as well; my point is only that this conclusion does not follow from the arguments given here.
What are the prospects for repairing this defect in EULAs? The problem is that norm completeness fails because the current norm governing contractual restrictions on reverse engineering is not value-justified. The solution is to ensure that a relevant valuejustified norm exists in regard to such restrictions. It does not seem difficult to propose such a norm; indeed, Julie Cohen and Mark Lemley argue persuasively that the norm should be that sellers may not prohibit reverse engineering when it is done for a legitimate purpose (such as to gain access to functional specifications necessary to make a compatible program), and when reverse engineering provides the only means of access to those elements of the software that are not protected by intellectual property rights. used software would be considerably less expensive (or available for free from libraries), yet might nonetheless meet the needs of many buyers.
The current norm is-roughly--that sellers may contractually prohibit transfers to third parties. This is a sanction-supported regularity: EULAs do routinely prohibit transfers, and courts enforce the prohibitions. 73 But do people think that they ought to abide by the regularity? They must if the regularity is to qualify as a norm, and it may seem they do not. After all, people routinely allow friends and acquaintances to copy that at least part of the explanation is that people think they ought not to make the software available in these ways. The "ought" here may be purely prudential. They may think that the activity is illegal and that they are very likely to get sued by the manufacturer, and on that basis they think they ought not to sell. For the sake of argument, let us agree that the current norm is that sellers may, at least, contractually 73 Id. In the Nineteenth Century, American libraries were founded to be public places of education and betterment, as democratic institutions. The library was a place of education that allowed the democratic governing populace to be sufficiently informed.
As an economic matter, the library was the answer to the tension between market-based information production and intellectual property as a necessary public good. Libraries are an exception to allow a limited monopoly on copyrighted works. It does, that is, to the extent that I am unable to acquire a web site creation program by other means. If there were a secondary market in-relatively cheap-used software, I might be able to buy a copy. However, the restriction on transfers to third-parties prevents the formation of such a market and thereby prevents the acquisition of software by those of limited financial means.
We should not, therefore, regard the "sellers may restrict transfers to thirdparties" norm as value-justified, and, as with prohibitions on reverse engineering, it follows that, standard form contracts used to mass market software, such terms should not be enforced. The argument is the same as before: enforcing such terms is inconsistent with realizing the normative goal of approximating the ideal formation process, and the persistence in EULAs of restrictions on transfers to third-parties is evidence that market forces are inadequate to eliminate such terms. As in the case of prohibitions on reverse engineering, this conclusion follows only for the standard form contracts used to mass market software and not for contracts where parties of roughly equal bargaining power explicitly negotiate terms. The difference is that, in standard form contracting, buyers rely on the existence of value-justified norms to ensure that the terms are acceptable while there is no such reliance in the case of explicitly negotiated terms.
What are the prospects of remedying this failure of the norm completeness assumption by ensuring that an appropriate, value-justified norm governs restrictions on transfers to third-parties? Should sellers have some ability to restrict transfers to thirdparties? The answer is unclear. As Anthony Reese notes, "[t]he first sale doctrine has been a major bulwark in providing public access by facilitating the existence of used book and record stores, video rental stores, and, perhaps most significantly, public EULAs are legitimately seen as a form of Internet contracting when the software is purchased over the Internet and delivered by downloading it; indeed, Internet purchase 81 There is a norm, familiar from but certainly not confined to free speech jurisprudence: a restriction on speech is not justified if there is a less restrictive alternative that adequately serves the purpose of the original restriction. "Explicit approval" provisions arguably conflict with this norm as there appears to be a less restrictive alternative: allow disclosure of results without requiring seller approval as long as the test complies with specified conditions (posted on a web site, for example). Benchmark testing restrictions now tend to be of the "comply with conditions" type. Such conditions began to replace "explicit approval" conditions after the court struck down Network Associates' "explicit approval" condition in People v. Network Associates, supra n. 80, at 468. 
V. TOUs
A complete treatment of TOUs would catalogue the types of risk allocation and normal course terms they contain and would determine whether the terms are governed relevant, value-justified norms. I will not offer such a treatment. I focus instead on the fact that TOUs typically contain provisions permitting the web site to collect and use information about web site visitors. I advance three claims. The first is that the current norm is that a business may collect and use a wide range of information about consumers.
The second is that this norm is not value-justified; the third, that it is unlikely that this lack of value-justification will be remedied any time soon.
In the United States, a business may, with relatively few restrictions, impose contractual terms that allow them to collect and use wide variety of different types of information about consumers. 83 I contend that this is not only the law, but also the prevailing norm, at least in the case of online businesses. The first part of the definition of a norm is fulfilled for online businesses: contractually-mediated online business 83 See, e. g., Joel R. We are witnessing an increased 'race to the bottom' in corporate surveillance of customers. Some companies are leading the charge through abusive and invasive profiling of their customers' data. This trend is seen by even the most privacy friendly companies as creating competitive disadvantage to those who do not follow that trend, and in some cases to find new and more innovative ways to become even more surveillance-intensive. 84 To remain competitive, companies increase their customer surveillance in response to increases by competitors; as a result TOUs contain terms allowing online businesses ever more expansive powers to collect and use information. This regularity is a sanctionsupported one. The courts routinely enforce contractual provisions allowing businesses to collect information.
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It may seem, however, that the second part of the definition of a norm cannot possibly be fulfilled; it may seem that consumers do not think they ought to abide by the regularity. After all, there has been, and continues to be, intense, widespread criticism of allowing business the largely unrestricted ability to collect and use information.
Allowing them to do so increases the risk of harm to individuals; 86 subjects us to information overload; 87 gives excessive, easily abused power to credit agencies, insurance companies, and businesses generally; 88 has a chilling effect on decisionmaking; inhibits the development of the self; 89 creates the possibility of approaching a perfect enforcement of rules and laws that would create a merciless "Big Brother"
inconsistent with the true demands of justice and forgiveness; 90 and puts civil society itself at risk. 91 It would, however, be a mistake to conclude that consumers do not think that they ought to abide by the norm. It is still possible, and indeed likely, that they do.
The reason is the simple, and by now familiar one, that the contractual provisions are enforceable, and people generally think they ought to obey the law; consequently, they ought to abide by laws that allow businesses to collect and use information. In any case, grant for the sake of argument that the current norm is that a business may impose the more efficient we are the less time, effort, and money we spend to achieve our desired results, and the more we have left over for other purposes. In the new technological and economic setting of the twenty-first century, we do not know how to make this tradeoff in an acceptable way. As Daniel Solove notes, 92 As with EULA restrictions on reverse engineering and transfers to third parties, this conclusion follows only for standard form, no negotiation agreements where web site visitors are relying on the existence of value-justified norms to ensure the acceptability of contractual terms. [p]rivacy is a concept in disarray. Nobody can articulate what it means. As one commentator has observed, privacy suffers from "an embarrassment of meanings." Privacy is far too vague a concept to guide adjudication and lawmaking, as abstract incantations of the importance of "privacy" do not fare well when pitted against more concretely stated countervailing interests.
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I am not suggesting that we cannot find an adequate resolution to the tradeoff between our interest in privacy and the gains of efficiency. I am just suggesting it will be a long and difficult task, and, until that task is completed, we will lack relevant, value-justified norms governing contractual provisions allowing businesses to collect information about their customers' activities.
VI. Conclusion
The requirement of value-justified norms is a powerful constraint on the enforceability of terms in standard form contracts. It makes the focus of enforceability the values of consumers since it requires enforceable terms to be consistent with norms that consumers do, or would on adequate reflection, regard as justified in light of their values. The justification for this requirement is that, by imposing it, we ensure that standard form contracting yields acceptable terms that enhance the freedom of buyers.
EULAs and TOUs illustrate the point. Both contain terms which fail to be governed by value-justified norms and the failure provides a reason for refusing to enforce those terms. The ultimate remedy, however, is to identify, or create, an appropriate valuejustified norm. How are appropriate value-justified norms to be identified or, where necessary, created? The analysis I have provided raises but does not answer this question. 94 Solove, supra n. 86, at 477 -8.
